Comments by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 3 Article 9 
Winter 12-1-1974 
Comments 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Comment, 26 S. C. L. Rev. 525 (1974). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TEMPORARY UTILITY RATE IN-
CREASES-SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES AUTHORIZING TEMPORARY
UTILITY RATE INCREASES UNDER BOND WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING TO
DETERMINE RATE REASONABLENESS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. Holt v.
Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 415 U.S. 969
(1974).
In Holt v. YonceI three residential customers of South Caro-
lina Electric and Gas Company (S.C.E. & G.) brought an action
2
for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the constitution-
ality of certain state statutes3 that allowed the implementation
of temporary utility rate increases without prior hearing to deter-
mine rate reasonableness. S.C.E.&G. and the individual mem-
1. 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 415 U.S. 969 (1974).
2. Plaintiffs brought the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Holt court found
without elaboration that defendants "clearly acted under color of state law." 370 F. Supp.
at 376. This comment will not treat the question of whether the color of state law or state
action requirement is satisfied. For a discussion of the state action requirement in utility
termination cases, see Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Termination of Util-
ity Services for Nonpayment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1485-94 (1973).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-38, 58-115 (1962). Section 24-38, applicable to electrical
utilities, provides:
Notwithstanding any such order of suspension the electrical utility may put
such suspended rate or rates into effect on the date when it or they would have
become effective if not so suspended by filing with the Commission a bond in a
reasonable amount approved by the Commission, with sureties approved by the
Commission, conditioned upon the refund, in a manner to be prescribed by
order of the Commission, to the persons, corporations, or municipalities respec-
tively entitled to the amount of the excess, if the rate or rates so put into effect
are finally determined to be excessive; or there may be substituted for such bond
other arrangements satisfactory to the Commission for the protection of the
parties interested.
Section 58-115, applicable to public utilities (other than electrical utilities), provides:
To enable it to make such investigations as in its opinion the public interest
requires, the Commission may, in its discretion, suspend the operation of the
new schedule for a period not exceeding sixty days. Unless as a result of its
investigation the Commission otherwise orders before the termination of such
period of sixty days, such new schedule or schedules shall thereupon become
effective. Should the Commission order the operation of any new schedule or
schedules suspended, as herein provided, the public utility may put such new
schedule into operation on the date when it would otherwise become effective
by filing with the Commission a satisfactory bond or by making other arrange-
ments satisfactory to the Commission for the protection, during such period of
suspension, of the parties interested should the Commission, after full hearing,
determine and order that such schedule shall not become effective in whole or
in part or without change or modification.
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hers of the South Carolina Public Service Commission (the Com-
mission) were defendants in the action. Plaintiffs claimed to rep-
resent themselves, the class of S.C.E.&G. residential customers,
and a sub-class of customers living on fixed low incomes who
allegedly would be unable to afford utility service under increased
rates. Their primary claim was that the practical effect of the in-
terim rate procedure was to deprive the sub-class of utility serv-
ices. Thus, plaintiffs contended that they were denied due process
of law under the fourteenth amendment by the interim rate pro-
cedure because it allowed citizens to be deprived, without a hear-
ing, of essential services to which they were constitutionally enti-
tled. The three-judge federal court,4 relying on the 1958 Supreme
Court decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light,
Gas and Water Division,5 held that the challenged statutes were
constitutional and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.' The United
States Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
7
Although the rate-setting functions of public utilities are cir-
cumscribed by statute in South Carolina,' a utility has the right
to set its own rates in the first instance,' but that right is subject
to Commission authority to find any portion of those rates unrea-
sonable.'0 During the investigatory period, the Commission may
suspend operation of the proposed rate schedule." The utility,
nevertheless, may implement the proposed rates as interim rates,
thirty days after the initial filing of the schedule,"2 by filing with
the Commission a bond'3 guaranteeing to repay to all customers
4. The single judge to whom this case was first referred denied plaintiffs' request for
a temporary injunction to prevent the implementation of the scheduled temporary rate
increase because he found that plaintiffs had failed to prove that there was a reasonable
probability they would succeed on the merits. However, at the request of the single judge,
a three-judge court was convened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. 370 F.
Supp. at 376.
5. 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
6. 370 F. Supp. at 379.
7. 415 U.S. 969 (1974), aff'g mem. 370 F. Supp. 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting from
summary affirmance).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-31 et seq., §§ 58-111 et seq.
9. Id. § 24-32 (Cum. Supp. 1973), § 58-114 (1962). But see Id. § 24-35 which permits
the Commission to investigate existing rates on its own motion, and Id. § 24-42 which
permits the Commission to order new rates into effect without hearing.
10. Id. §§ 24-31, 24-35, 24-40, 58-119.
11. Id. §§ 24-37, 58-115. Under section 24-37, the suspension period is ninety days,
but may be extended for a period not to exceed one year. The suspension period under
section 58-115 is sixty days.
12. Id. §§ 24-36 to -38, 58-114, 58-115.
13. Id. § 24-38. The statute permits either "a bond in a reasonable amount" or as
substitution for such bond "other arrangements satisfactory to the Commission for the
LVol. 26
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any part of the increase not thereafter approved.14 The interim
rates remain in effect until the final Commission determination
with respect to reasonableness. 5
Recently, the extrapolative scope and building-block opera-
tion of the due process concept 6 have attracted consumer forces
in their efforts to realign the traditional relationship between
public utilities and consumers. 7 The conceptual groundwork for
the due process extension into public utility consumer law was
laid in the Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases." These cases injected
protection of the parties interested." Section 58-115 contains similar language. In the 1973
rate application of S.C.E.&G., the bond was "a pledge of its credit, secured by all its
assets." Supplemental Answer of Defendant S.C.E.&G. at 1, Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp.
374 (D.S.C. 1973).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-38, 58-115. The bonding feature is a common provision in
many state regulatory statutes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 16-19 (Supp. 1969);
GA. CODE ANN. § 93-307.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.6 (Cum. Supp.
1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 37-56 (Cum. Supp. 1973). Typically, however, interim increase
under bond is allowed only after expiration of the statutory suspension period or some
significant portion of that period. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378.6 (1968); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 62-134, 62-135 (Cum. Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1974). The unilateral interim increase at any time during the suspension period is
allowed in only a few states other than South Carolina. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§ 153 (1953); Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-39 (1972).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-38, 58-115. The South Carolina statutory procedure is
aptly illustrated by the 1973 rate increase application of S.C.E.&G. which served as the
factual basis of plaintiffs' complaint in Holt. On May 24, 1973, S.C.E.&G. filed notice
with the Commission of a schedule of retail gas and electricity rates to become effective
on July 2, 1973. The schedule represented increases of approximately 22% for gas and 13%
for electric service. Answer of Defendant S.C.E.&G. at 4. For an elaboration on the
increases sought and granted, see note 66 infra. The Commission suspended the effective
date of the rate increase until January 2, 1974, and ordered public hearings to begin
October 3, 1973. On June 11, S.C.E.&G. filed an "undertaking" with the Commission,
giving notice of its intent to place the new rates into effect on July 2, 1973, despite the
Commission suspension order. Before the increase could be effectuated, utility rates were
frozen until August 12, 1973, by the "Phase IV" national economic policy, and the
Commission was advised by S.C.E.&G. that the new rates would not go into effect until
August 13, 1973. The proposed undertaking by S.C.E.&G., a pledge of credit, was ap-
proved by the Commission in executive session, as to form and sufficiency only, on July
24, 1973. On August 1, the Holt action was initiated. Public hearings concluded on Nov-
ember 1, 1973. The final order of the Commission was issued on May 30, 1974. Holt v.
Yonce, 370 F. Supp. at 375; Order Granting Rates & Charges, Public Service Commission
of South Carolina, No. 17,648, Docket No. 16,824 (May 30, 1974) at 1, 2 (hereinafter cited
as Order).
16. The scope of due process is determined by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion" in which the "doctrine of a particular case is not allowed to end with its
enunciation and . .. an expression in an opinion yields later to the impact of facts
unforeseen." Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 287 (1957).
17. See Note, supra note 2; Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public
Utility Consumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 744 (1972).
18. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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the traditional due process requisites of notice and hearing into
certain situations in which summary proceedings"9 resulted in the
adjudication of broadly-defined individual property rights.
20
Relying on these precedents, a series of recent district court opin-
ions held that, in order to comply with due process, the individual
consumer must be provided a hearing prior to termination of
utility services for alleged nonpayment of account. 21 The basis for
decision in the utility termination cases resided in the property
interest doctrine of entitlement developed in the Sniadach line of
cases.22 The utility termination cases emphasized electric, gas
and water utility services as modern necessities and commented
on the hardships caused by deprivation of these services .23 Com-
paring the interests delineated in the Sniadach cases, the courts
in the utility termination cases found that an individual's interest
in utility service was sufficiently important to fall within the
Sniadach-Fuentes due process ambit.
24
The Holt plaintiffs plainly sought to analogize the rationale
19. These proceedings were Wisconsin's pre-judgment wage garnishment procedure
(Sniadach); New York City's termination of welfare benefits (Goldberg); Georgia's sus-
pension of uninsured motorists' drivers' licenses (Bell); and Florida's and Pennsylvania's
replevin processes (Fuentes).
20. The interpretation of property includes "important interests" (Bell) and "statu-
tory entitlements" (Goldberg) encompassing any significant interest in property, even if
disputed (Fuentes), regardless of its technical or common law status as "right" or "privi-
lege" (Goldberg). See Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public Utility Con-
sumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 744, 745-47 (1972).
21. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford
v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F.
Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Lamb v. Hamblin, 57
F.R.D. 58 (D. Minn. 1972); Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971) [hereinafter
collectively referred to as the utility termination cases]. Contra, Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973) (no state action).
22. In Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the
entitlement doctrine was explained in the following language:
[O]nce the state has undertaken to provide a service to the public, be it welfare
or unemployment benefits, drivers' licenses or tax exemptions, it must then
comply with the requirements of due process before it can terminate access to
such service or benefits in the case of any given individual. This is the concept
of the "entitlement", which provides the individual with his only line of defense
against arbitrary withdrawal by the state of his access to what, although initially
not his right to demand, he has become dependent upon.
Id. at 447 (footnotes omitted).
23. E.g., Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 720 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v.
Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 244 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
24. E.g., Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), in
which the court states: "It is beyond doubt that electric service can become as vital to
the existence and livelihood of an individual as a driver's license or welfare check." Id. at
447.
4
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of the Sniadach line and utility termination cases to the tempo-
rary rate increase situation. The plaintiffs argued that the tempo-
rary rate increase without prior hearing was an arbitrary depriva-
tion of plaintiffs' property in two ways: (1) for customers who
would be able to pay the increased charges, the temporary rates
would cause a deprivation of the use of their income to the extent
of the increase during the interim period, and (2) for customers
who would be unable to pay because of limited income, the in-
creased rates would result in a termination of utility service, or a
"taking" of plaintiffs' important interest in and entitlement to
gas and electric utility service.
25
In a per curiam opinion, the three-judge court in Holt de-
clined the opportunity to extend the constitutional limits of the
due process clause. Noting that the holding sought by the plain-
tiffs would "necessitate that this court extend Sniadach and its
progeny to an uncharted point not supported by any cited author-
ity," 26 the court tersely dispensed with the plaintiffs' claims by
stating, "We refuse to sanction such an extension. ' 2 The court
refrained from any further analysis of the due process extension
sought or of the issues raised and instead cited United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division~s as control-
ling authority:
In that case, the United States Supreme Court upheld provi-
sions of the Natural Gas Act which allow for temporary rate
increases without a prior hearing, and which provisions are sub-
stantially similar to the challenged parts of the South Carolina
statutes. . . . We feel that this decision of the United States
Supreme Court is dispositive of all issues raised by the plaintiffs
in the instant action .... 29
The court's choice of authority and its absence of explanation
for that choice are interesting; no constitutional issues were
raised by the parties or discussed by the Court in United Gas.
Because of the Holt court's approach, one can only speculate
about what aspects of United Gas actually entered into the
court's deliberations. The language quoted above indicates that
25. Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, 7.
26. 370 F. Supp. at 377.
27. Id.
28. 358 U.S. 103 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as United Gas).
29. 370 F. Supp. at 377-79 (footnote omitted). The Natural Gks Act is codified in 15
U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
1974]
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the significant factor may have been the Supreme Court's failure
to find the "substantially similar" federal statute unconstitu-
tional. If so, such broad reliance on United Gas as controlling
would be questionable. The court in Holt noted a significant dif-
ference between the two statutes: the federal statute precludes
unilateral increase until expiration of the five month suspension
period, while the state statute allows the increase thirty days
after the initial schedule filings .3 Although the Holt court la-
belled this a mere "technical distinction" which had "no legal
import,"3' the difference does have a substantive effect on the
utility/consumer relationship; the longer suspension period al-
lows additional time for the regulatory lag between administra-
tive hearing and final order, with the concomitant possibility of
eliminating interim rate increases entirely or at least reducing
significantly the total impact of those rates on the consumer.
32
The more probable basis of the Holt court's reliance on
United Gas, however, was a narrower analogy of the statutory
provision and factual situation in that case to the Holt situation.
The issue in United Gas was whether a natural gas company
could, without agreement by its customers, increase its wholesale
rates under tariff-and-service type contracts merely because it
had complied with provisions of the Natural Gas Act authorizing
rate increases on the filing of timely notice. The agreements in
issue contained pricing provisions which incorporated by refer-
ence seller's rate schedule, or any effective superseding rate
schedule, as filed with the Federal Power Commission. The Court
construed this as an agreement to buy at seller's current "going
rate, '33 as distinguished from a contract at a single fixed rate. The
Court held that, under such an agreement, seller was contrac-
tually free to change its rates subject only to the procedures and
limitations of the Natural Gas Act.34 Emphasizing the common
law rights of the utility, the Court said:
[E]xcept as specifically limited by the Act, the rate-making
powers of natural gas companies were to be no different from
those they would possess in the absence of the Act: to establish
ex parte, and change at will, the rates offered to prospective
30. 370 F. Supp. at 378.
31. Id.
32. One year and six days elapsed between S.C.E.&G.'s initial filing on May 24, 1973,
and the issuance of the Commission order on May 30, 1974. See note 15 supra.
33. 358 U.S. at 110.
34. Id. at 112-13.
[Vol. 26
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customers; or to fix by contract, and change only by mutual
agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular customer.35
Accordingly, United Gas can be construed as concluding that
the utility customer, absent contract, has no right to utility serv-
ice at a specific rate .3 Under this interpretation, the Holt
adherence to United Gas represents a threshold finding which
negates plaintiffs' basic premise that there is in fact a property
interest involved. This finding distinguishes sub silentio the
Sniadach line of cases which did find property interests of varying
degrees. 37
In setting out the property interest involved, the Holt plain-
tiffs offered little more than gloss, relying exclusively on the right
to utility service developed in the utility termination cases." As
applied by the Holt court, the United Gas rationale adds a limit-
ing caveat to the holdings of the utility termination cases; the
protected right to utility service is the right to utility service at
those rates established under the applicable statutes. Even if the
Holt plaintiffs had anticipated this rationale, however, they could
not have relied on the statutory "just and reasonable" rate stan-
dard39 to establish a statutory right to a specific rate. The proba-
ble judicial interpretation of that statutory provision would have
a circular effect; the right to a "just and reasonable" rate is the
right to the rate determined by statutory procedure."
Because the court omitted more specific delineation of its
reasons for reliance on United Gas, the Holt method of disposition
will be less likely to be followed by other courts. In Sellers v. Iowa
Power and Light Co.,4" involving a similar claim42 under a similar
35. Id. at 110, quoting from United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350
U.S. 332, 343 (1956).
36. This proposition is approved in Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp.
1169, 1172 (S.D. Iowa 1974), citing Wright v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 297 U.S. 537,
542 (1936); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933); San
Antonio Util. League v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 86 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 301 U.S. 682 (1936); United States Light & Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls Gas &
Elec. Light Co., 47 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 864 (1931).
37. See note 20 supra.
38. Brief for Plaintiffs at 8, 10.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-31 (1962).
40. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951), in which the Court held that the right to reasonable rates, under the Federal Power
Act, is the right to the rate which the Federal Power Commission files or fixes.
41. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
42. The Sellers plaintiffs described the property taken as the money required to pay
the rate increases. 372 F. Supp. at 1172. The Sellers court found that this claim of property
1974]
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state regulatory statute,43 the three-judge court briefly discussed
the Holt holding. The Sellers court, however, rather pointedly
avoided summary reliance on United Gas:
While there is much pertinent language in United Gas Co. v.
Memphis Gas Div., [sic] the [Supreme] Court did not have
before it the due process arguments now being raised. It also
preceded the Fuentes-Sniadach line of cases. We believe it ad-
visable to set forth in more detail our reasons for agreeing with
the result reached by the court in Holt v. Yonce.11
In resolving the property interest issue, the Sellers court used
a syllogistic analysis to state what the Holt court merely implied.
The Sellers court quoted United Gas for the proposition that, at
common law, a public Utility "like the seller of an unregulated
commodity, has the right in the first instance to change its rates
as it will, unless it has undertaken by contract not to do so. 4 5 As
the second step in its analysis, the Sellers court relied on cases
other than United Gas for the proposition that "utility customers
have no vested rights in any fixed utility rates."" Under these
circumstances, the court concluded, plaintiffs had no constitu-
tionally protected property interest in existing rates.
4 7
The court in Holt considered United Gas "dispositive of all
issues raised [in Holt],"' 8 but this characterization is somewhat
misleading. United Gas is actually "dispositive" in Holt only in
the sense that the finding of an absence of a property interest
precludes the necessity for any further inquiry into the depriva-
tion alleged." Thus, the court's approach in Holt avoided consid-
eration of several other elements of plaintiffs' argument which
merit examination.
interest, absent a showing of deprivation "of the very means by which to live," was "too
broadly stated to be within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1172-
73. The Sellers plaintiffs did not attempt to frame the "effective termination" argument
used by the Holt plaintiffs.
43. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.6 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Section 490A.6 provides for imple-
mentation of the increased interim rate under bond only after ninety days of suspension.
44. 372 F. Supp. at 1171.
45. Id. at 1172, quoting from United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div., 358 U.S. at 113. The Holt court cited this proposition as well, but as part of
a long wholesale quotation of "apposite comments" from United Gas. 370 F. Supp. at 378.
46. 372 F. Supp. at 1172. See note 36 supra.
47. 372 F. Supp. at 1172.
48. 370 F. Supp. at 379.
49. "The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to a deprivation of an
interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection." Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
8
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A major flaw in plaintiffs' claim involved the inherent diffi-
culty in framing the alleged deprivation as a direct appropriation
of property." In Brown v. Hausman,- plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of Connecticut rate procedures5 2 which allowed,
at the discretion of the state Public Utilities Commission, a tem-
porary bus fare increase pending hearing. In holding that no con-
stitutional right of plaintiffs was denied,,3 the Brown court con-
sidered the nature of the deprivation alleged:
In the first place, the "deprivation" of property here [a taking
of money] is indirect, at best, and is most likely not a depriva-
tion within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
extra 15 cents per bus ride has not been taken from these plain-
tiffs, at least not in the sense that welfare benefits were taken
in Goldberg or a stove was taken in Fuentes. It may be that in
plaintiffs' circumstances bus transportation is highly desirable,
but no action of the state requires them to use the bus and hence
incur the added charge.M
The Holt plaintiffs sought to distinguish Brown by arguing that
the state of South Carolina, by granting a monopoly to utilities, 5
required customers to use the electric and gas services of
S.C.E.&G. and thus required customers to pay the increased
rates." This argument, however, belies the nature of the commod-
ity purchase involved. The purchase of utility service in the Holt
utility/consumer relationship is based on the payment of a certain
charge per unit of consumption. The conceptual nature of that
purchase is that the individual consumer determines the extent
of his use of the service, and thus he determines the amount of
its cost to him. This element of consumer choice and self-
regulation undercuts the attempt to characterize the rate increase
as a direct appropriation of money. The same conceptual diffi-
culty is compounded in the "effective termination" argument in
which plaintiffs sought to equate the rate increase and the termi-
50. The "taking" prohibition of the fifth amendment refers only to direct appropria-
tions of property. Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 933 (1960); California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist., 333 F.
Supp. 436, 443 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
51. Brown v. Hausman, Civil No. 15,081 (D. Conn., filed June 21, 1972).
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 16-19 (Supp. 1969).
53. Civil No. 15,081 at 6.
54. Id. at 3-4.
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-13 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973).
56. Brief for Plaintiffs at 1, 5-6.
57. See note 50 supra.
1974]
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nation of utility service. The rate increase may present an eco-
nomic burden, but the consumer retains the alternatives of an
offsetting reduction in utility consumption and a proportionate
reduction of income expenditure elsewhere in the budget. Accord-
ingly, any eventual termination of services resulting from the
decision by the consumer to forego payment for utility service is
only indirectly the demonstrable result of a utility rate increase."
Thus, the Sniadach line of cases and the utility termination
cases, both involving direct appropriations, are clearly distin-
guishable from the Holt situation.
The Holt due process claim also raises the issue of whether
the adjudicative hearing provided in the Sniadach line applied to
a legislative or quasi-legislative activity such as rate-making.59 In
Sniadach and its progeny, the hearing protection granted was for
the purpose of resolving some factual dispute between the parties
prior to the temporary deprivation of the property interest in-
volved." Likewise, in the utility termination cases, the require-
ment that a hearing be held prior to shut-off for alleged nonpay-
ment allowed the adjudication of some factual dispute between
the utility and customer; such as, payment not credited on ac-
count, computation error in billing, or lack of notice.' No dis-
putes grounded on particular facts relating to the individual cus-
tomer are present in the Holt situation. In the pre-increase hear-
ing sought by the Holt plaintiffs, the customer complaint would
be the inability to afford payment under the increased rates. This
type of complaint would not be a factual dispute requiring adju-
58. Plaintiffs' "effective termination" argument lacked any sound evidentiary basis.
Relying on 1970 Census figures for the metropolitan Columbia, South Carolina, area,
plaintiffs presented the mean annual income from Social Security benefits ($1,435) and
the mean annual income from public assistance ($738). Brief for Plaintiffs at 7. Plaintiffs
then alleged that they, as individuals, "stand to lose a minimum of $10 per month if able
to pay defendants at all under the increased rates," and that those class members finan-
cially unable to pay the increased rates "stand to lose utility service altogether." Memo-
randum for Plaintiffs at 9. No further empirical facts were alleged.
59. For a discussion of rate-making as a legislative or quasi-legislative hearing in the
context of the adjudicative or legislative fact distinction, see 1 K. DAvis, ADMniSTRATIvE
LAW §§ 7.01-.06 (1958).
60. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Court states:
These [hearing] rights are important in cases such as those before us, in which
recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or mis-
leading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of
particular cases.
Id. at 268.
61. See, e.g., Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), in which the factual dispute involved is described as an "Orwellian nightmare."
[Vol. 26
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dicatory resolution in the rate hearing; rather, if proved, it would
be a legislative fact and would enter into the rate determination
only insofar as such evidence would be considered by the Com-
mission.
2
Given the theoretical failings outlined above, the due process
argument posited by the Holt plaintiffs appears to have been a
tortured effort to trigger the application of constitutional princi-
ples. Further, the weaknesses in plaintiffs' argument are weak-
nesses which would be inherent in any such argument on the Holt
facts. The temporary utility rate increase, in fact, may be an
economic hardship on consumers. Under traditional due process
standards, however, it is an economic reality which is not trans-
latable into a constitutional imperative.
Despite the absence of any sound constitutional claims by
utility consumers in this area, important practical and policy
considerations are present which would seem to warrant a change
in the statutory procedure for temporary rate implemention. The
regulatory statutes represent the end result of the legislature's
efforts to accommodate, in more or less check-and-balance fash-
ion, the varying interests of the state, consumers, and utilities.
The rationale ascribed to the interim rate-making procedure, as
a part of that balancing process, is founded on what is termed
"business reality. 63 Under this view, the utility is allowed to
collect additional customer revenues during the interim period of
regulatory lag to lessen the difficulties in procuring equity or debt
62. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). In Hahn, tenants in
federally subsidized housing claimed a constitutional right to a formal hearing before the
Federal Housing Administration prior to approval of any rent increases. In rejecting the
tenants' claim, the Hahn court relied on the distinction between adjudicatory and legisla-
tive facts. The court determined that the proceeding in which plaintiffs sought to assert
their interests was basically a rate-making process. 430 F.2d at 1248. As a result, the court
then found that the procedural safeguards plaintiffs sought, while characteristic of adjudi-
catory proceedings, were not essential in legislative proceedings such as rate-making, in
which the administrative decision depended on broad familiarity with economic condi-
tions. Id.
The Hahn court also concluded that the formal adversary hearing sought by plaintiffs
would contribute "little or nothing" to the agency's understanding of the issues:
The tenants are unlikely to have special familiarity with their landlord's finan-
cial condition, the intricacies of project management, or the state of the econ-
omy in the surrounding area . . . .Thus the elaborate procedural safeguards
which plaintiffs demand are unlikely to elicit essential information in the gen-
eral run of cases.
Id. See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 59, at § 7.02.
63. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. at
113-14, quoted in Holt v. Yonce, supra note 1, at 378-79.
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financing," while at the same time mitigating any loss to custom-
ers under the bonding requirement.'5
The South Carolina interim rate procedure, however, ap-
pears to strike an inequitable accommodation of interests in sev-
eral respects. From the utility's perspective,* the temporary rate
increase allows an immediate accession to revenues in the full
amount sought. Unencumbered by any lengthy rate suspension
pending review, the utility simply has the use of more money for
a longer period of time.6 With interest set at six per cent per
annum,67 the statute also has the effect of allowing the utility to
secure financing from its customers at a rate more favorable than
financing from conventional marketplace sources." Additionally,
64. Id.
65. This accommodation of interests was considered in Sellers v. Iowa Light & Power
Co. In Sellers, the court assumed the existence of a property interest for the purposes of
its discussion and weighed the opposing desires involved in the interim increase. The court
found that the utility's right to a fair return and the governmental and public interest in
the financial stability of the utility outweighed the customers' interest in avoiding interim
rates, since the bonding provision mitigates customer loss by guaranteeing a refund. 372
F. Supp. at 1172-73.
66. The financial significance of the interim rate hike is substantial. S.C.E.&G.'s
projected figures (based on the year ending December 31, 1972) indicated that the pro-
posed rate increases would provide $18,229,048 in additional yearly revenues, and an
increase in rate of return on rate base from 7.02% to 8.61%. Order at 1, 24; Application of
S.C.E.&G. for Rate Adjustments (May 23, 1973) at 1, 3. The final Commission order
provided for an increase in rate of return on rate base to 8.47%, and additional gross
revenues of $16,142,528 for an approved increase in total after-tax income of $7,856,568.
Order at 18, 19, 24. Based on these figures, the excess of interim rates over approved rates
equalled approximately $1,500,000 over the nine and one-half month interim period from
August 13, 1973 to June 1, 1974. At the ordered interest rate of six per cent per annum,
the S.C.E.&G. refund, in the form of credits on future utility bills, amounted to approxi-
mately $1,570,000.
67. S.C. CODa ANN. §§ 24-38, 58-115 specify no rate of interest on refund. The final
Commission order, however, set the interest rate at six per cent per annum. Order at 26.
At the time of this writing, the Commission is considering the imposition of higher interest
rates.
68. This effect is noted in the regulatory provisions of West Virginia. W. VA. CoDE
ANN. § 24-2-4 (Cum. Supp. 1974) sets the refund interest rate at "not less than six nor
more than ten percent per annum as specified by the commission" and further provides:
In specifying the applicable interest rate between the aforesaid minimum and
maximum, the commission shall be guided by the interest rate which such
public utility would in all probability have to agree to pay if such public utility
at that time borrowed in the marketplace a sum of money equivalent to the
amount of money the commission estimates the increase in rates will produce
between the effective date of such increase and the anticipated date the rates
will be finally fixed for such public utility, it being intended that a public utility
should be discouraged from imposing higher rates than it should reasonably
anticipate will be finally fixed as a means in effect of borrowing money at a rate
of interest less than such public utility would have to agree to pay if it borrowed
12
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under the present statute, the efficacy of any refund may become
quickly illusory. By the legally available expedient of filing an-
other schedule of increased rates, filing a sufficient bond, and
waiting thirty days, the utility can effectively nullify any refund
relief obtained by Commission order after ultimate review. 9 In
addition to this potential for abuse, the present regulatory proce-
dure disregards the consumer interest in providing no more reve-
nue than is necessary for the utility's proper function. The state
scheme purports to assess considerations of "business reality,"
but it makes no provision for evaluating the validity of a utility's
alleged need for additional revenues in the interim period be-
tween request for and approval of higher rates. The more equita-
ble statutory alternative to the automatic unilateral rate increase
would be to allow the Commission sole discretion, after reasona-
ble notice and hearing, to fix and determine temporary rates"
with provision for recoupment of any interim loss to the utility."
This kind of interim hearing would provide a forum for consumer
money in the marketplace. No such accrued interest paid on any such refund
shall be deemed part of the cost of doing business in a subsequent application
for changing rates or any decision thereon.
69. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S.
103, 119-20, 120 n.5 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
70. Arkansas requires such a hearing prior to implementation of any interim rates
during the suspension period. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-217 (b) (1957), after setting out the
length of the rate suspension period, includes this proviso:
[I]f the public utility contends that an immediate and impelling necessity
exists for the requested rate increase, a petition may be filed with the Commis-
sion narrating such alleged circumstances, which petition must be set for hear-
ing within fifteen [15] days from the date of the filing thereof or to such
subsequent time as may be mutually agreeable to the Commission and the
utility, and if the Commission finds at such hearing that there is substantial
merit to the allegation of the utility's claims, said Commission may permit all
or a portion of said rates to become effective . ..
This language was part of a 1955 amendment. It is interesting that, prior to amendment,
the wording of subsection (b) was nearly identical to that of South Carolina Code section
24-38. See Compiler's Notes to § 73-217.
Pennsylvania also requires a hearing before the imposition of interim rates. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 66, § 1150 (a) (1959) provides in part:
The commission may, in any proceeding involving the rates of a public utility
brought either upon its own motion or upon complaint, after reasonable notice
and hearing, if it be of opinion that the public interest so requires, immediately
fix, determine, and prescribe temporary rates to be charged by such public
utility, pending the final determination of such rate proceeding.
New Jersey allows rate adjustments during the pendency of hearing only after nego-
tiation and agreement by the utility and the Board of Public Utility Commissioners. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.1 (1969).
71. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1150 (e) (1959).
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complaints of the Holt type, and, more importantly, it would
allow the application of a public interest "check" to the "business
reality" balance presently afforded the public utility.
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